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Conflict can be described as a condition in which actions of one person prevent or compel some 
outcome at the resistance of the other. Quite often this can be seen as “two or more competing, often 
incompatible, responses to same event”. In this paper, a statistical approach to conflict resolution 
using the concept of bargaining game theory is presented. The approach gives chances of failure that 
are minimal since any offer made in a conflict situation is tied to the likelihood of it being accepted as it 
takes into considerations the demands from the other party. The approach presents a fair way of 
solving a conflict without affecting a system. An employer-employee relationship was used to illustrate 
the application of the approach.  
 





In the recent past, formal models and quantitative 
analysis have come a long way towards explaining how 
strategic actors bargain in a variety of conflict settings. In 
a conflict, for instance, in the political setting or 
international relations, bargaining plays a central role in 
understanding and solving any conflict and thus the 
masterly of the concept of bargaining is very important, 
(Banks, 1990; Bennett, 1996; Huth and Allee, 2002; 
London, 2002; Powell, 1987; Powell, 1996). To 
understand the basics of logic of bargaining in the face of 
conflicting interests, Game theory has played a key role 
to this end. Political scientist have employed for instance, 
bargaining models to analyze effects of open and closed 
rules on the distributive politics of legislative appropriation 
to the study of war initiation and termination (Baron and 
Ferejohn, 1989; Mansfield et al., 2000).  
Most conflicts are mostly triggered by the differences in 
opinions and interpretation of an idea. It is therefore im-
portant that these differences are understood in terms of 
there magnitude in a conflict and taken care of before any 
bargaining can commence. This gives the opinion of each 
party an unbiased attention since they fairly assign time/ 
attention based on their contribution in a conflict.  
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have pointed to the importance of asymmetric information 
and the “reservation values” of players in distributional 
politics. In general, it is important to understand the 
effects of substantive variables on the bargaining pro-
cess. The theoretical models tell us something about the 
path by which these variables may influence outcomes. 
To fully understand the bargaining problem, research 
has been conducted on the empirical relationship 
between substantive variables of interest, such as regime 
type, economic interdependence, institutional rules, legis-
lative composition and bargaining outcomes (McCarty 
and Poole, 1995; Werner 1999). However, lacking an 
explicit model of the process that generates the empirical 
data, and leaving out the choice-based path by which 
these variables influence decisions, it is often the case 
that selection and omitted variable bias plague the 
analysis (King et al., 1994). In particular, Signorino (1999, 
2002) demonstrates that traditional linear and categorical 
estimation techniques can lead to faulty inferences when 
the strategic data generating process is ignored during 
estimation. 
For effective bargaining there is every need to integrate 
theoretical models and statistical methods (Ramsay and 
Signorino, 2006). A statistical tool that supports theore-
tical consistent inferences about the relationship between 
substantive variables, the bargain struck, and the 
probability of bargaining failure is needed. An Ultimatum 
bargaining games model which is a statistical model has 
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the bargain struck and the probability of bargaining 
failure, Ramsay and Signorino (2006).The model 
presents the relationship between the variables that 
affect the players’ utilities and the outcomes of the 
bargaining in a strategic setting. 
Using the Ultimatum bargaining model, we present a 
case of conflict in a social context where the contested 
opinions are seen as the regressor variable(s) and the 
outcome are seen as the dependent variable(s). 
 
 
THE ULTIMATUM GAME 
 
Assuming a scenario of two players in a bargaining arena 
as shown in Figure 1, where the two players must divide 
a contested prize, which is represented as Q. Let the 




< QQ . Without loss of generality, shift the 






The game then proceeds as follows: Player 1 first 
offers some division of the prize (Q*- y; y), where player 
1's allocation is Q*-y and player 2's is y. Player 2 then 
decides whether to accept or reject player 1's offer. If 
player 2 accepts, they divide the prize according to player 
1's offer. If player 2 rejects the offer, they receive some 
reservation amount, which may differ between the 
players. 
Assuming each player's utility for bargaining failure has 
two components: one that is public knowledge and one 
that is  private,  then,  we  denote  player  1's  reservation  




value as 11 +R  and player 2's as 22 +R , where Ri is 
player i's publicly observable reservation value and i  is 
private information. Let nature draw the type i  of each 
player i from a well defined probability distribution. 
Assume that each player has a well defined prior 
beliefs about the distribution of these types and that each 
type is drawn independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d) from the cumulative distribution function Fi (.), with a 
corresponding everywhere positive density fi (.), 
mean 0=iµ  variance ∞<
2
iσ . We also assume the fi's 
are continuously differentiable. Each player's strategy can 
be characterized by a mapping from types into actions: 
{ }2,1,: =→ iAiii σ , where Ai defines the action set 
for player i. Since player 1 is making the ultimatum offer, 
A1 ={y: y ∈  [0;Q*]}, player 2 is then left to accept or reject 
the offer, so A2 = {accept; reject}. 
If its is further assumed that both players’ utilities are 
strictly increasing and continuous in their amount of the 
disputed good, and by the random utility structure, the 
public and private components of the players' utilities are 
additively separable. That is; assuming: 
 
u1 (y; accept) = Q*- y 
u2 (y; accept) = y 
u1(y; reject) = R1 + 1  
u2(y; reject) = R2 + 2  
 
Equilibrium in the statistical Ultimatum game has player 1 
making an offer that balances and maximizes the 
marginal utility of increasing the probability that an offer is 
accepted and the marginal utility of a larger amount of y. 
Player 2, knowing her own type, chooses the alternative 
that maximizes her utility. 
 
 
UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS EXISTENCE 
IN AN ULTIMATUM GAME 
 
In a game, players will set strategies that map a random 
variable to their action space so as to win the game, such 
as a traditional Bayesian game or random utility model. 
The player's actions are however probabilistic rather than 
deterministic. 
Noting that a Nash equilibrium of a statistical Ultimatum 
bargaining game, where each player knows the other has 
random utilities, is equivalent to a perfect Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium of an underlying Bayesian game, where the 
types of the players are private information, we use the 
well-known game theoretic tools to begin to specify both 
our theoretical predictions and our empirical estimator. If 
the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE) of this 
underlying game can be shown to be unique, then we 
can solve for the equilibrium strategies and characterize 
an   equilibrium   probability  distribution  over  observable  
 




outcomes. It is this characteristic of the Ultimatum model 
that will allow for its structural estimation.  
 
Proposition 1: If 
2
F  is log-concave, then there exists a 
unique perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium to the 
statistical Ultimatum game. 
Assuming player 1 has made an offer y, player 2 
chooses between that offer and her reservation value R2 



















Player 1 does not observe 2 , but must assess the 




















Now consider the optimization problem for player 1, given 





F (y- R2). (Q* - y) + (1- 
2
F (y -R2)). (R1 
+ 1 );                                                                     (1) 
 
By the first order condition (F.O.C) and the log-concavity 
of
2





















                     (2) 
 
However, **0 Qy ≤≤ and some times y* will be outside 
the feasible set. We can then show that an end-point (0 
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Empirical model of the Ultimatum game 
 
The application of the Ultimatum game in empirical 
analysis requires that a distribution for the i , and the 
appropriate likelihood are specified given the dependent 
variable(s). 
Assume we have data on both player 1's and player 2's 
actions that is, assume we can measure and code y and 
Q* for each observation, as well as whether player 2 
accepted or rejected the offer. Let the public portion of 
the players' reservation values be 
XR β=1 and ZR γ=2 , where X and Z are sets of 
substantive regressors. Our interest is in estimating the 
effects of X and Z on y and player 2's decision. 
Since the outcome of the bargaining model consists of 
two dependent variables that is, 1's offer and 2's 
decision, then the probability model is a joint density over 
these random variables. The estimates can be obtained 
by assuming that the types of players 1 and 2 are drawn 
i.i.d. from a logistic distribution. 
 
Proposition 2: If 
2
F  is logistic, then it is log-concave. 
Considering player 2's decision with a logistic error 
term in the random utility equation, then the probability 
that player 2 accepts the offer y is just the logit 
probability. 
 
( ) ( )γZyyaccept −∧=/Pr                               (4) 
 














                  (5) 
 
where ( ).∧  is the logit cumulative distribution function 
(c.d.f) and ( ).λ is the logit p.d.f.. Solving for y* gives: 
 
( )( )11** 1*1 −−−−−−−−=  ZXQeXQy γβωβ     (6) 
 
Where; ω  is Lambert's ω , which solves transcendental 
functions of the form wez ω= for ω . Lambert's ω  is 
useful here because it is known to have nice properties. 
First, Lambert's ω  is single valued on R+. Second,ω 's 
first and second derivatives exist and are well behaved, 
making it easy to show that y* is a monotonic function of 
1 and allowing for the derivation of the probability 
density function for equilibrium offers. 
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The constraint on the action space of player 1, however, 
implies that the observed y* is censored both from above 
and below. 
 
Remark: Suppose player 1 plays the strategy 1s  in 
equation 3, then the distribution of y* is the truncated 
distribution of the unconstrained y*, where the truncation 
points are from below at 0 and above at Q* 
Take variables { }1,,0, ykk ∈δ  such that 10 =δ  if y = 
0, 1=yδ  if 0 < y < Q* and 11 =δ  if y = Q*. That is, a 
censored model with a “latent” best offer in the constraint 
set. Otherwise there is the best feasible offer, at, a 
boundary point. 
Taking player 2's acceptance as 1=acceptδ  if she 
accepted the offer and 0=acceptδ  if she rejected the 
offer and assuming we have data on both player 1 and 
player 2 actions (that is, y and acceptδ ), then the likelihood 
would be: 
 










( )( ) ( )<− acceptacceptXQy ** .PrPr1. 1 δδ  
( ) − acceptreject 1Pr. δ   
 
This gives the log-likelihood function for our data in terms 
of distributions already derived, which are functions of our 
regressors, and which explicitly models the Ultimatum 
game. Estimates of β  and γ  are obtained using 
maximum likelihood estimation. 




APPLICATION OF BARGAINING BEHAVIOUR TO 
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT RESOLUTIONS 
 
The theory of bargaining is important due to its nature of 
cutting across the various disciplines. The concept has 
been employed in areas like multinational cooperation 
and states over terms of foreign investment, to the 
resolution of territorial disputes, to social issues in 
relationships. 
At this point, however, we examine the application of 
the bargaining model to conflict resolution in a society 
with keen emphasis to its statistical interpretation. As 
discussed in the Ultimatum game, there are basically two 
players to a game. This could be seen as parties to any 
dispute, that is, the proponent of a given view and the 
opposer of the given view. Thus considering player 1 as 
the proponent of a given view and player 2 as the 
opposser to the ideas or views as presented or adduced 
by player 1, then we can apply the bargaining model to a 
conflict resolution set up. 
For instance, in an industrial strike, player 1 may be the 
employer and player 2 may be the employees. If there 
exist a conflict between the employer and the employees, 
one could expect that there exists grounds for some 
misunderstandings. If the issues are well defined, it is 
possible to quantify them or even model them. Suppose 
the conflict between the employer and the employee is on 
salaries. The employer may make an offer after taking 
into consideration a number of factors, e.g., economic 
factors, motivational factors etc; let us take all these 
factors to be the variables. It is possible that among these 
factors there are those which are public and those which 
are private. In uniqueness of equilibrium and its existence 
in an Ultimatum game, these factors were identified as 
player’s utility for bargaining failure and have been 
denoted by iiR + . Where iR  are the publicly known 
variables and i are the private variables. Similarly, the 
employees will be making demands with both public and 
private variables. To avoid any conflict, if a demand is 
adduced by the employees to the employer, we propose 
a model that will give an employer an opportunity to make 
an offer that will be acceptable to the employees.  
For illustration, let us take the variables that the 
employer will be taking into consideration in order to 
make any offer to be denoted by 
i
X  and the variables 
possibly considered by employees in making a given 
demand to be denoted by
i
Z . Of critical concern is for 
the estimation of the effects of these variables on the 
outcome that is, on y (employer’s allocation or demand) 
and the decision on the employees (accept or reject an 
offer). We assume that the concerns of both parties are  
drawn i.i.d from a logistic distribution.  
Let =
i
XR β1 be public reservation values for employer 
 






ZR γ2 be the public reservation 
values for employees. Then the probability that the 
employees accept the offer y will be given by equation 4. 
But the optimal offer by the employer *y will be given 
equation 5. Solving for *y  will give by the best offer so 
that the employees will accept the offer and a conflict will 
be settled which will present an equilibrium strategy for 





The logit bargaining model can appropriately be used to 
address and mitigate failures in a conflict by enabling the 
parties to make reasonably acceptable offers and 
demands. The bargaining games can be applied to a 
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